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For Lent I gave up writing book reviews. Most readers will assume that such a
decision hardly demanded a sacrifice, but they would be sadly mistaken, for I am
currently suffering from a malaise common to post-prelim graduate students
know as DAH (pronounced "duh")--Dissertation Avoidance Hysteria. No cure
currently exists for DAH, and so those of us who suffer from it must resort to
treating the symptoms: frequent headaches, uncontrollable stuttering when queried about either the topic of our dissertations or progress recently made, and
unbounded enthusiasm for any and every project that may divert us from our
appointed task. And so in order to survive a disease that can easily metastasize
and infect every area of one's life (and which in some cases is terminal), I've
taken to popping aspirin, practicing silence and eschewing the writing of book
reVIews.
That is, I did so until I read Stanley Hauerwas's latest offering.
I should perhaps explain, since the reasons for ending my self-imposed moratorium, even at great risk to my future well-being, might easily be misinterpreted. I decided to write this review not because I believed Hauerwas's most
recent musings were so profound that I simply had to get the word out. Nor did I
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undertake this project merely to be able to add yet another entry to my impressive list of publications appearing in prestigious journals. Rather, I embarked on
this mission because Hauerwas taught me an important lesson: that Christians
are called to be a people who have (or create) time for the trivial. This insight
(to which I will later return) struck me as so revolutionary that I decided to in- .
corporate it into my way of life. Hence, when I was approached by the editor of
this journal to offer some reflections on Christian Existence Today, I thought to
myself: "How better to embody concretely my new found appreciation for and
commitment to the trivial?"
Before I proceed to important matters, perhaps I may appropriately begin
with a somewhat trivial aside. As his students know, Hauerwas refers to this collection rather affectionately as Christian Existence Yesterday, since the editor of
Labyrinth Press (who will remain anonymous) possessed the manuscript for no
trivial amount of time before he was able to bring it out. Of course, Hauerwas
was inhibited from asking for a title change, for to have done so would have obscured his allusion to Barth's short tract, Theological Existence Today. Some
cynical readers, undoubtedly, will deny that the two works have anything in common ("I knew Karl Barth. Karl Barth was a friend of mine ...."). The one possible
exception might be the length of time taken to write each: Barth makes no secret
that his work was written over a single weekend.
Concerning more important matters, let me begin by noting that, not surprisingly, many of the issues that arise in this latest collection of essays are those
which Hauerwas's readers have come to expect: virtue, narrative, practical reason, moral formation and peace. But it would be a mistake to assume from this
that CET is merely another attempt by Hauerwas to use these notions to launch
his latest diatribe against the poverty of American Christian ethics. Rather, like
most of us, the more be writes about these matters, the more clarity and precision be attains. Since Hauerwas rightly believes that thinking and writing should
normally not be distinguished, those who have read his works to this point have
had the opportunity to "see" him think through these issues. Hauerwas readily
admits that his " project" remains unfinished (and is therefore inadequately characterized as a " project"), and whatever advances it provides depend on the dialogical character of his discourse. That is, Hauerwas, more than some authors,
wants and needs his readers and critics. This willingness to allow others to look
over his shoulder stems from his belief that having the right " position" or " answer" is not enough; a person must be clear about how she got there. Otherwise,
there is no way of knowing whether one has arrived at "the same" position or
not, or whether one has arrived anywhere at all. None of this, of course, is meant
to imply that Hauerwas's latest book finally clarifies everything; however, there
are several aspects of his thinking that are presented with a good deal more lucidity, and as such have the potential to help us understand more clearly what
Hauerwas is about. Perhaps the biggest payoff of such clarity is that it may make
it possible for us to know better how to have a disagreement with him.
Of course, Hauerwas would approve of this, for he is in the business of engendering disagreement. Hence, it is quite fitting that Hauerwas introduces his lat-
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est collection by responding to the now well-known accusation leveled by his former teacher and long-time friend, James Gustafson. For those unfamiliar with
the details, Gustafson accuses Hauerwas of succumbing to the so-called "sectarian temptation." This temptation, according to Gustafson, stems from the fact
that Christianity's identity is threatened by the pluralism that marks contemporary societies. As a result, this threat naturally generates a conservative, or sectarian, reaction that attempts to regain a distinct sense of identity for Christianity
by resorting to a strategy of "sectarian withdrawal." This withdrawal is buttressed by Hauerwas and others whose theoretical positions, according to Gustafson, entail "theological fideism" and "sociological tribalism."
Hauerwas acknowledges that part of his reason for beginning with his disagreement with Gustafson is to provide a touchstone for the remainder of the
book; that is, readers will be able to test his "defense" of his position in the introduction against the constructive proposals that are displayed throughout the
book. But perhaps more importantly, Hauerwas's introduction reminds readers
that what is at stake in reading and responding to arguments is not so much "defending'' this or that " position"; rather, it is coming to understand that persons
are often "captured" by certain habits of mind and life that deeply affect the way
they see the world. Thus, Hauerwas shows his readers that to disagree with Gustafson involves not merely denying the latter's charges of sectarianism, tribalism,
fideism, irresponsibility and the like, but more basically coming to conceptual
clarity about why Gustafson "sees" the problems in these terms to begin with,
and subsequently, why one perhaps might want to deny Gustafson's descriptions.
In short, Hauerwas's introduction helps the reader understand one of the prinary philosophical issues that Hauerwas variously displays throughout his book:
trguments, including moral arguments, cannot be separated from the descripions that not merely accompany them, but make them possible. Hence, moral
trgurnent often entails the complex process of persuading an audience that they
1eed not, perhaps even must not, accept the first stage of any argument; indeed,
ierhaps the only stage necessary to throw into relief what is at issue, is redecription.
So Hauerwas carefully sketches out in his introduction, and then further sugests in his later chapters, why he rejects Gustafson's characterization of his potion. Hauerwas begins by admitting that if bis "position" is a temptation, he
::>pes people will succumb to it; however, he rejects Gustafson's notion that giv.g in to such a temptation necessarily opens one to the charge of "sectarianm." Hauerwas rightly notes that such a charge begs the very epistemological
1d sociological questions that are at issue, while appearing to stand above them.
other words, the charge of sectarianism often serves as a cipher for little more
an "you are wrong not to take responsibility for the world in the way that I
1." In other words, such a charge serves to mask the fact that how the Church
.derstands and exercises its responsibility to the world is precisely the point at
ue, and one on which Hauerwas has written at length. That Hauerwas is weary
having those arguments summarily dismissed as "sectarian" is evident in bis
ssionate rebuttal to those who have leveled such charges: "Show me where I

68

Kenneson

am wrong about God, Jesus, the limits of liberalism, the nature of the virtues, or
the doctrine of the church--but do not shortcut that task by calling me a sectarian" (p. 8).
Similarly, Hauerwas argues that Gustafson's charge of " irresponsibility"
wrongly presupposes that Christians must take up an "all or nothing" attitude
toward a "given" society. That Hauerwas rejects such a view is attested to by one
of the themes that runs throughout this collection (and many of bis other writings): That part of what the Church is called to be is a people of virtue capable
of making judgments about what it can and cannot affirm about the society in
which it finds itself. "The issue," Hauerwas asserts, "is how the church can provide the interpretative categories to help Christians better understand the positive and negative aspects of their societies and guide their subsequent selective
participation" (p. 11). Such interpretive categories, in turn, are only "available"
if the community sustains certain practices that are capable of throwing into relief those aspects of a society which they cannot affirm. For example, Hauerwas
believes that Christian communities must denounce the state's willingness to resort to violence, but they can only do so to the extent that they embody that virtue which is essential for their life and witness to the world, the virtue of peacemaking.
Although Hauerwas has written much on this in the past, his brief essay
" Peacemaking: The Virtue of the Church" contains perhaps his most clear and
succinct thinking on why this virtue must remain integral for all communities
who purport to follow Jesus. This essay, which consists of his extended reflections on Matthew 18:15-22, helpfully displays the relationship between the virtue
of peacemaking and a theological understanding of who Christians believe themselves to be as members of communities that attempt to follow Jesus. Understanding such a relationship requires seeing the connection between a community's call to live as forgiven people and the fact that to the extent to which it
commits itself to the truth, such a community will necessarily engender conflict.
Hauerwas recognizes that the difficult question is how to conjoin in one community those two seemingly irreconcilable practices: on the one band, that each
Christian community is called to be that place where forgiveness is always available; and on the other hand, that each community, in calling its members to accountability to the truth of Jesus Christ, is called to make judgments that often
exacerbate conflict. That these two practices appear irreconcilable is itself, Hauerwas suggests, indicative of the problem. Part of the problem stems from the
fact that our notion of "peace" is seldom theologically informed; that is, our notion of peace is often indistinguishable from that truncated view of peace as the
complete absence of conflict, that "false peace of the world which is too often
built more on power than truth" (p. 95). Such a notion hinders us from recognizing that genuine peacemaking cannot be separated from the practice of speaking
the truth; however, such truth-speaking is directed not first of all to the world,
but to ourselves. Such a posture has the potential to transform the nature of confrontation both within and without the community, for it reminds us that "we
confront one another not as forgivers, not as those who use forgiveness as
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power, but first and foremost as people who have learned the truth about ourselves--namely, that we are all people who need to be and have been forgiven"
(pp. 93-94).
Hauerwas also helpfully illuminates the Christian virtue of hope in his essay
(written with Thomas Shaffer) entitled "Hope Faces Power: Thomas More and
the King of England." This essay serves as a powerful example of a point that
Hauerwas never fails to emphasize: Theological/moral judgments cannot be
made in the abstract, but require that a people malce discriminations in concrete
situations. That such is the case is one reason Hauerwas spends so much energy
exploring the relationships between character, virtue and the story of a particular
people. But what Hauerwas does in this and several other essays throughout this
collection is to display these relationships with an illuminating concreteness that
stems from his ability to weave together theological/moral reflection and personal narrative. That is, by telling More's story in a particular way, Hauerwas
had greatly enriched our theological/moral imaginations by helping us see how
inseparable were More's life and his theological/moral commitments.
These above-mentioned essays are but two examples of how themes which
have held a prominent place in Hauerwas's thinking--peacemaking and hope-continue to be fleshed out in this latest collection. What is perhaps most encouraging about this fleshing out is how Hauerwas has gone about doing it. First, I
think it is fair to say that in his latest offering Hauerwas has virtually stopped
talking about "narrative" as an abstraction and has increasingly moved toward
!ngaging particular narratives, a strategy which has allowed him to exhibit pow:rfully how it is that these narratives are essential to argument. Similarly, Hauervas tends to say less these days about "virtue" in the abstract and more about
pecifically Christian virtues--that is, more about how the story of Jesus and
hose who follow Him makes a difference to how these virtues are construed by
nd embodied in particular communities. Equally promising is that both of the
bove trends have made it possible, indeed necessary, for Hauerwas to engage
10re directly with Christian Scripture.
It is tempting to offer further specific comments about other essays in the colction, such as how Hauerwas talks about practical reason in ways that might
.alee it possible to rehabilitate casuistry as a legitimate Christian moral practice;
>W his recurrent theme of moral formation looks when he reflects on the place
· "formal" education, and especially so-called "Christian" education; or how his
1derstanding of "character" plays out when it is directed toward the character
those who have a special call to be ministers of the gospel. But I'll resist such
notating, which might mislead some people into thinking that they needn't
id the book, and concentrate the remainder of my reflections on what is perps the most provocative and suggestive theme that runs throughout these es1s: the theme of time.
Somewhat ironically, that the issue of time flows as a persistent undercurrent
oughout these pages is a tribute to the positive influence of Gustafson. In fact,
! might go as far as to say that the prominent place which the issue of time
; in Hauerwas's thought is unintelligible apart from Gustafson's reflections on
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the relationship of time and community, particularly as Gustafson displays it in
several chapters (and in the appendix, which is a summary of Gustafson's dissertation) of Treasure in Earthen Vessels. In short, Gustafson argues that time is
constitutive of community in that the latter is such only insofar as it is a community of language, of interpretation, of memory and understanding, and of belief
and action. Each of these constitutive aspects of all human communities (including the Church) are thoroughly infused by temporality; that is, they are penetrated throughout by the dialectical forces of the past, present and future.
That Hauerwas has learned these lessons well hardly requires substantiation.
Regular readers of Hauerwas need only be reminded of the prominent place of
concepts such as narrative, description, remembering and conviction, to see how
thoroughly Hauerwas has internalized the important place of time in any discussion of community. The central issue for any such discussion is that of continuity
and/or identity over time. As Gustafson notes, there are usually important
analogies between how one understands the self and time and how one understands community. But Hauerwas, perhaps more than most of the philosophers
whom Gustafson deals with, attempts to integrate more fully the dialectical relationship between the self and community, both of which are thoroughly immersed in time. One of the ways Hauerwas keeps the dialectic operative is by
insisting that community is prior to the self; that is, it is a mistake lo start from a
construal of the self and then move to an understanding of community. Hence,
with regard to the self and its continuity/identity over time, Hauerwas suggests
that no such continuity/identity is possible apart from that selfs "character" and
its ability to situate itself coherently within a narrative (which may amount to the
same thing)--both of which are irreducibly communal. Likewise, Hauerwas's
concern for the continuity of self and community over time is the reason for his
emphasis on virtue, for "the virtues bind our past with our future by providing us
with the continuity of self' (p. 265). With regard to the continuity/identity of the
Christian community over time, Hauerwas points first of all not to the "character" of the Church, but to the faithful character of God as most fully revealed in
the story of Israel and Jesus of Nazareth, and as remembered, embodied and
performed by those who have been called to radical discipleship. Hence, all of
the categories that have become the hallmark of Hauerwas's work--character,
narrative, memory, virtue--all are attempts to make connections between the
selfs communal nature and the community's irreducibly temporal character.
But it may well be that Hauerwas has pushed the importance of time even
further than did Gustafson, or at least in directions which the latter never seriously considered. This is particularly the case with Hauerwas's emphasis on the
"eschatological" character of Christian communities, a category about which he
remained somewhat oblique in his earlier writings, but about which he is noY
beginning to demonstrate some lucidity. This emphasis surfaces, for example, i1
his insistence that salvation involves the "creation of a timeful people" (p. 50
whose existence on behalf of the world creates "a space and time in which w
might have a foretaste of the Kingdom" (p. 106).
The notion that salvation involves the creation of a timeful people is criticc
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for Hauerwas for several reasons. First, it avoids the problem with many "classical" theories of the atonement, which, by framing the discussion of salvation by
means of the abstract category of "atonement," malces it possible, if not necessary, to spealc of salvation apart from the community which such salvation creates. Such theories tend toward gnosticism in that they suggest that salvation involves little more than God's "work" and our knowledge of it. But Hauerwas insists that salvation is not simply a matter of knowledge, of knowing that we are a
people who are "saved"; rather, salvation involves being saved "to" something (a
new people) which is inseparable from, indeed simply is, salvation itself.
Second, by emphasizing salvation as the creation of an eschatological community, Hauerwas suggests that it may not be possible to know what salvation
means apart from such a community; that is, it may be that salvation is so closely
tied to what it means to be such an eschatological community--a community
whose very life together is an important, albeit an insufficient, expression of the
presence of the Kingdom--that one should not, perhaps cannot, frame the issue
of salvation apart from participation in such a community. Said in a different
way, Hauerwas reminds us that salvation must reach to the very core of what it
means to be human, which, without appearing to "essentialize" what we mean by
the "human," can be affirmed to be irreducibly temporal; that is, all that we
"are" (or hope to be) is inextricably connected with the fact that we belong to
communities of language, of interpretation, of memory and understanding, and
of belief and action, all of which are thoroughly infused with temporality. So
whatever else salvation may be, Hauerwas is right to suggest that God cannot
truly "save" us while ignoring the fact that we need to be redeemed from the
tyrannies of time that enslave us. We need a "new" time. But any " time" that
will really be "new" must necessarily involve the "redemption" of our language,
nterpretations, memories, beliefs, actions, and the like. (This, I take it, is part of
,..hat Hauerwas means to imply by the title of one of his essays: "The Church as
:Jod's New Language.") Because this is the case, Hauerwas is right to insist that
ucb a new, eschatological "time" cannot come to us apart from a community
hat is involved in the very temporally-infused activities noted above. Thus, we
annot be saved from the tyranny of time apart from the creation of a " timeful"
eople, a people who institute a new, escbatological relationship to time.
Finally, by emphasizing the "timeful" and therefore communal nature of salttion, Hauerwas bas perhaps done us the greatest service by "historicizing"
hat salvation must be in twentieth-century America. It is not enough simply to
y that what it means to be human is irreducibly temporal, for how humans ex:rience time in a given culture is all important. While I cannot do justice here
the complex structures of time instituted within modern capitalist societies,
rhaps it is enough to be reminded of how such societies encourage a calculatand economizing attitude toward time. The fact that we speak of time as
nething we can spend, save, waste, use and buy is only one indication of bow
:h societies transform time into another, if not the most valuable, commodity.
t that Christians have been redeemed is another way of saying that they have
!n brought into a community that embodies the truth that time is ultimately a
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gift. A people whose lives are marked by this gratuitousness can "afford" to take
time for the trivial, for they have been freed from the tyranny of thinking that
their ultimate destiny and happiness is tied to how they "spend" their time. This
freedom makes it possible for a "new'' time to appear, a time for caring for
those who do not promise to make the world a better place, a time for being
with those who do not promise to contribute to our status, a time for entering
into the gratuitous and joyful worship of a God who does not promise that things
will always work out " right."
Of course, to the extent that Christian communities fail to embody such redemption, that is, to the extent that they fail to embody such freedom from the
tyranny of economized time, their redemption/sanctification remains seriously
incomplete. But to the extent that they engage in practices which challenge this
reigning view of time, we may confidently assert that there the kingdom is breaking in, there the eschatological is being realized.
Hauerwas has many more provocative things to say about time, such as its intimate relationship to peace, and its ability to create the "space" necessary to
resist the totalitarian powers that would drain our lives of their meaning. But
perhaps I have pointed to enough to suggest how potentially integrating such an
understanding of time might be. In short, we can thank Hauerwas for helping us
to see how we might move away from thinking of the distinction between Church
and world primarily in spatial categories. By suggesting that much of what is important about this crucial distinction is missed when we fail to construe it in temporal categories--as the distinction between two aeons, as Yoder puts it--Hauerwas has given us much to consider, not the least of which is one more reason to
doubt those who accuse him of sectarianism. Such charges, which are usually
coupled with accusations of "withdrawal,'' are so closely bound to spatial metaphors that they fail to account for the temporal dimension. In other words, if the
first thing one wants to say about the distinctiveness of the church is not that it
inhabits a different "space," but that its life is ordered by a new time, then it
becomes difficult to see what sense the charge of " withdrawal" makes. If such a
shift in emphasis is one of Hauerwas's goals, then he has made some important
headway; however, given such an objective, Hauerwas might have been wise to
choose a subtitle that didn't appear to trade on the very spatial metaphors he
wishes to minimize. Furthermore, he might consider giving us more help in seeing how the spatial and temporal are connected. One place where he has begun
to do this well concerns his understanding of hospitality: because Christians live
with a different relationship to time, they have the freedom to welcome the
stranger into their "space." We can only hope to see more connections along
these lines in the future.
Since it seems unlikely that Hauerwas will quit writing books anytime soon,
perhaps it may be worth taking a few moments to suggest, rather presumptu·
ously I suppose, what else we might hope Hauerwas will do in the coming years
As noted above, Hauerwas seems to be at his best when he combines two differ·
ent elements: closely reasoned argument and narrative depiction. For example
Hauerwas is both provocative and stimulating when he takes up a suggestive re
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mark by someone like Yoder, spells out the "philosophical" arguments entailed
by Yoder's remark in a more deliberate manner than Yoder either needs or
cares to do, and interweaves such "abstract" work with a story that provides material for theological imagination. Hauerwas has different ways in which he does
this, sometimes using a story to introduce the issues at stake (such as his discussion with a philosopher about school prayer), sometimes using a narrative to
frame the whole argument (such as his essay on Thomas More), other times using the stories more as exemplifications of the more abstract arguments he has
adduced (such as his use of Olin Teague as an example of practical reasoning
within a concrete community). What makes these examples so impressive is not
so much that Hauerwas knows how to do both things at once (although he does
and many of us probably don't), but that they help us see that both are argument; that is, that these are merely two necessary moments in any discussion
that seeks to be illuminative. So, in any future work, we can only hope that Hauerwas continues to make the most of this gift.
As far as enigmas that remain in his work, one general area may be alluded
to. In the introduction to this collection, Hauerwas suggests that Christians
should withdraw their support from civic republicanism only when that form of
government or society resorts to violence to maintain order and external society
(p. 15). This is a theme that Hauerwas has sounded before. While readers may
find themselves in agreement with Hauerwas in principle, it remains for him to
help readers see what resources are available to help "form" people in such a
way that making such discriminations is possible. Hauerwas would be the first to
admit that making discriminations about what counts for violence is no easy matter (and certainly cannot be made in the abstract), but it seems that it is precisely
at this very difficult juncture that we are left on our own. Furthermore, Hauerwas has not yet explored the implications for his understanding of violence and
peace once it is recognized that much of the violence which enslaves us and others is what has been called "symbolic violence." What makes such violence so
pernicious is that it exerts its power without resorting to physical coercion. What
practices and strategies might Christians engage in to create the space possible
to live without such violence?
Similarly, Hauerwas may have to help his readers even more in coming to see
what kind of community will be necessary for this kind of formation to take
place. For example, while some readers will no doubt resonate with Hauerwas's
contention that "at times and in some circumstances Christians will find it impossible to participate in government, in aspects of the economy, or in the educational system" (p. 15), others may find the whole notion of "participation"
here so vague that their imaginations are stymied when they attempt to consider
how they might do otherwise. Admittedly, that many of us may find ourselves
incapable of such imaginative forays is perhaps less a function of Hauerwas's
;hortcomings and more a reflection of our own captivity to particular habits of
mind and life, yet such an admission hardly gets Hauerwas off the hook; it simply
means that he may have to keep arguing what he's been arguing for a long time
)efore anyone can really hear what he's saying, or more importantly perhaps, be-
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fore anyone will know what to do or be if they discern that what he's been saying
is true.
Now, Hauerwas both would and would not want us to take alJ of this (or ourselves) so seriously. After all, reading books, writing reviews, conversing with our
friends, sharing a meal, jogging at noon--these are perhaps trivial matters, and
yet they are of tremendous ethical importance, particularly to the extent that
they create the time (and peace) necessary for us to live as a redeemed people,
which may entail nothing less than having the freedom to go on joyfully doing
things like the above even when it seems like we should be directing all our energies to more urgent matters. Of course, bringing all of this to your attention
probably only serves as a reminder; after all, I would expect that readers who
have endured this article are no doubt already consummate connoisseurs of the
trivial.

